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1.  Introduction 
 
It is reasonable to say that Adam Smith (1776) has played an important role in the 
development of welfare theory. The reasons are at least two. In the first place, he created the 
invisible hand idea that is one of the most fundamental equilibrating relations in Economic 
Theory; the equalization of rates of returns as enforced by a tendency of factors to move from 
low to high returns through the allocation of capital to individual industries by self-interested 
investors. The self-interest will result in an optimal allocation of capital for society. He writes: 
“Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous 
employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not 
that of society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather 
necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to society”. 
 
He does not stop there but notes that what is true for investment is true for economic activity 
in general. “Every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society 
as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it”.  He concludes: “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from the regard of their own 
interest”. The most famous line is probably the following:  The individual is “led by an   2
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention”. The invisible hand is 
competition, and this idea was present already in the work of the brilliant and undervalued 
Irish economist Richard Cantillon. He sees the invisible hand as embodied in a central 
planner, guiding the economy to a social optimum
1. 
 
The second reason why Adam Smith played an important role in the development of welfare 
theory is that, in an attempt to explain the “Water and Diamond Paradox”, he came across an 
important distinction in value theory. At the end of the fourth chapter of the first book in 
Adam Smith’s celebrated volume The Wealth of Nations (1776), he brings up a valuation 
problem that is usually referred to as The Value Paradox
2. He writes  
 
“The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes 
expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other 
goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called “value in use”; the 
other, “value in exchange”. The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently 
little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in 
exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it 
will purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond on 
the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may 
frequently be had in exchange for it.”
3   
 
He is unable to credibly resolve the paradox - although he uses three chapters to convince the 
reader that it can be resolved by the components of the natural price, i.e., essentially the 
notion that the long-run price is determined by the production costs. Some of the reasons 
behind the “failure” are not farfetched. Adam Smith was aware of supply and demand without 
being able to produce anything fresh about the fundamental ideas upon which these concepts 
rest. He was not aware of the idea to model the total utility value of consumption in terms of a 
utility function, and the related idea of assuming that the utility function exhibits a declining 
marginal utility.  
 
Rather, it was Jules Dupuit (1844) and Heinrich Gossen (1854), who founded the modern 
utilitarian framework in Economics. Adam Smith’s distinction between value-in-use and 
value-in-exchange nevertheless contain a non-trivial insight, which is fundamental for the 
answer to the Water and Diamond Paradox. The value in exchange is not enough to measure   3
welfare. As Dupuit pointed out, you also need the consumer surplus which is the difference 
between the total surplus and the value in exchange. 
 
The next important step in the development of welfare theory was unmistakably achieved by 
Leon Walras (1874). He introduced the full fledged general equilibrium system based on the 
fundamental principles of utility maximization and profit maximization (firms). He showed 
that only relative prices could be determined, since only relative prices affects the actions of  
firms and consumers, which means that an n-goods system has only n-1 independent 
equations. A point that Walras expressed by picking one good as numeraire which 
conveniently can be given unit price. He also showed that the budget constraint of each 
consumer and the objective functions facing the firms together imply that the market value of 
supply equals the market value of demand independent of the price vector. Most modern 
welfare results are in one way or another connected to the competitive general equilibrium 
system. 
 
However, what was still missing after Walras had done the unifying job in his magnum opus 
Element d´Economie Politique Pure, was an idea how to rank different general equilibrium 
allocations. Economists had long been aware of that distributional issues matter, and that  
Jeremy Bentham’s idea of maximizing utility of the maximum number of people  typically 
involves one maximum too many to be feasible. It was Vilfredo Pareto, who took the 
distributional issue quite a bit further.  He made two key contributions to existing theory. 
First, he realized that it was not necessary, as was implicit in 19:th century Economics, that 
utility was cardinal, i.e., measurable in the manner which makes interpersonal utility 
comparisons possible. It was enough for deriving demand functions that utility was ordinal, 
i.e., only the individuals’ rankings of different commodity bundles matter (utilities are ranked 
not their differences). As Pareto (1909) expressed it in the second edition of his Manuel 
d’Economie Politique
4: “The individual may disappear, provided he leaves us that photograph 
of his tastes”. More formally, any monotone transformation of the utility function will result 
in the same demand vector
5. The second and most important contribution is a partial ordering 
that admitted inter-personal welfare comparisons. He proposed that welfare increases if some 
people gain and nobody loses. Welfare declines if some people lose and nobody gains. If 
some gain and some lose, the welfare change is ambiguous, no verdict. This partial ordering 
was later called the Pareto criterion. 
   4
Clearly, it is always favorable to exhaust all mutually advantageous trades, and the resulting 
state is called Pareto optimal. Pareto realized that there are typically many such states starting 
from a given allocation of the initial resources. To illustrate Pareto optimality he could have 
used the concept of the contract curve that was invented 25 years earlier by Francis Ysidro 
Edgeworth (1881), but he used both the contract curve and a box that strangely enough today 
is called an Edgeworth box, perhaps since it encompasses the contract curve.  
 
Now the time had come to produce modern welfare theory, and the man who did it was a 
student of Alfred Marshall and a classmate of John Maynard Keynes at Cambridge, England, 
namely Arthur Cecil Pigou. In Wealth and Welfare (1912) he discussed how a judicious 
government can increase welfare. The full fledged version of the modern welfare theory was 
fleshed out in The Economics of Welfare (1920). Apart from containing most of the relevant 
welfare results that follow from the Pareto criterion and Walras’ general equilibrium system it 
also, by introducing externalities and showing how they can be handled by environmental 
taxes, foreshadowing modern environmental economics by almost 50 years. The welfare 
optimizing (improving) taxes under externalities are today called Pigouvian taxes
6. The 
driving force behind Pigou’s contribution to welfare economics is his distinction between 
private and social cost. If they coincide the invisible hand, driven by self-interest, will tend to 
bring about an efficient allocation of resources (first best). In reality, with existing 
externalities (both positive and negative), there is room for improvement of the allocation by 
e.g. environmental taxes or subsidies. Another of Pigou’s contributions, A Study in Public 
Finance (1947), contains fundamental insights with respect to public good provision; in 
particular, how the use of distortionary taxation modifies the cost benefit analysis underlying 
the supply of public goods. These ideas were later developed by other researchers into the 
concept of ‘marginal cost of public funds’. 
 
Pigou’s contributions were mainly dressed in prose. He was, unlike his teacher Marshall, not 
well educated in mathematics. He went to Cambridge to study history and literature. A full 
fledged stringent version of modern welfare theory had to wait until the publication of Abba 
P. Lerner’s (1934) paper and the book The Control of Economic Resources (1944). Lerner 
was the first to describe the system as a whole and to show that a competitive market 
economy generates a Pareto optimal allocation of resources; a result known as the First 
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. Starting from a competitive equilibrium he 
shows that the conditions for an optimal allocation of consumption goods are fulfilled, as well   5
as the condition for efficiency in production. Finally, he shows that in equilibrium there is 
equality between the marginal rate of substitution in consumption and marginal rate of 
transformation in production for each pair of goods. The reason is that both producers and 
consumers optimize their action facing the same prize vector. In other words, a competitive 
economy generates a Pareto optimal allocation of resources where both consumption and 
production are efficient; a formal proof of Adam Smith invisible hand conjecture. A similar 
proof can be found in Oskar Lange (1942), while Kenneth Arrow (1951a) uses topological 
methods and separating hyperplane theorems. 
 
Lange and Taylor (1938) and Lerner (1944) also discussed the reverse result, that all Pareto 
optima can be supported by a price system after lump sum transfers of the initial wealth 
endowment. They did not produce a formal proof, but the conjecture was important for the 
discussion whether planned economies could reach a Pareto optimum. The first formal proof 
of this conjecture is probably due to Arrow (1951a), and the result is known as the Second 
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. We will return to these theorems below. 
 
The Pareto criterion leaves the distributional problem unsolved. Arbraham Bergson 
suggested, in a paper published in 1938, that this problem can be addressed by a welfare 
function, which is an increasing function of the consumer’s utility functions. Technically, we 
can now solve the resource allocation problem by maximizing the social welfare function 
subject to the technological constraints. The resulting allocation will be Pareto optimal, and 
the income distribution will be the appropriate one. However, the more specific preferences 
we build into the welfare function, the more relevant it will be to ask the question: Why this 
particular form of welfare function? Where does it come from, and does it reflect the 
preferences of the population in a reasonable way? This problem was approached by Arrow, 
who in a famous monograph first published in 1951 showed that if one starts from reasonable 
axioms on individual preferences and tries to aggregate them into a social ordering that fulfils 
similar axioms, this is impossible. At least one of the social choice axioms is violated. Most 
proofs (including Arrow’s own) show this by proving that the non-dictatorship condition is 
violated. Many researchers have tried to modify the axioms to resolve the conflict between 
individual and social orderings, but no fully satisfactory solution has been found. The result is 
called Arrows Impossibility Theorem or, for that matter, the Third Fundamental Theorem of 
Welfare Economics. 
   6
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple static Walrasian 
general equilibrium model, which serves as a benchmark to be used in later sections. The 
principles of cost benefit analysis are dealt with in Sections 3. Section 4 addresses three 
fundamental issues; namely, The First and Second Welfare Theorems mentioned above, as 
well as introduces The Core of the Market Economy. The welfare gains from free trade are 
briefly discussed in Section 5, while Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is discussed in Section 6. 
Section 7 deals with externalities and introduces the concept of Pigouvian taxes, whereas 
public goods are dealt with in Section 8. Section 9 briefly discusses the area of Mechanism 
Design. Finally, Section 10 extends the benchmark model to a dynamic framework. This is 
interesting for at least two reasons. First, the extension allows us to address the time-
dimension and, therefore, introduce dynamic analogues to some of the concepts addressed in 
earlier sections. Second, and more importantly, it enables to connect our survey on Welfare 
Theory to the growing literature on welfare measurement in dynamic economies. 
 
2.  A Simple Walrasian General Equilibrium model 
 
To illustrate the efficiency properties of a Walrasian equilibrium, we will discuss the most 
simple Walrasian equilibrium model that involves production. We later modify the model to 
deal with distributional issues and the First- and Second Welfare Theorem, externalities, taxes 
and second best considerations. We also discuss Arrows Impossibility Theorem (The Third 
Welfare Theorem). 
 
Let us start with the consumer, who has a strictly concave and twice continuously 
differentiable utility function denoted by 
 
(, )
s uu x l =       (1) 
 
where x is the demand for a consumption good, and 
s l  is the supply of labor. The utility 
function is increasing in consumption and decreasing in labor. The budget constraint of the 
consumer is  
 
0( , ; , ,
ss wl px B x l p w ) π π +− = =              (2) 
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where p and w are the prices of consumer goods and labor. Here π  is the profit income from 
the production sector/the firm. It enters the budget constraint, since the representative 
individual is assumed to own the firm. The firm has the technology/ production function 
 
()
s x fl =       (3) 
 
where 
s x  is the supply of goods and l is the demand for labor/the input of labor.  The 
production function is increasing in l, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable.  
 
The firm maximizes profit, while treating p and w as exogenous, which generates the optimal 
profit function 
 
[,) ] m a x { ( ) } (,) (,)
s
l
p w pf l wl px p w wl p w π =− = −    (4) 
 
The consumer maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint, treating p, w and π  as 
exogenous, which gives the optimal value (indirect utility) function  
 
,




uxpw l pw uxl xl Bxl pw
s π ππ =∈  (5) 
 
Now, let us substitute the profit function into the budget constraint as well as into the demand 
and supply function of the consumer to obtain 
 
(,) [(,) (,) ] [ (,) (,) ] 0
ss Bpw pxpw x pw w lpw l pw = −+−=   (6)               
 
The first term is the value of excess demand in the market for goods, while the second term is 
the value of excess demand in the labor market. This equation means that the values of excess 
demands sum to zero, independently of prices. A little thought reveals that this condition 
holds for any number of markets and any number of consumers or firms. One can view 
equation (6) and its generalization as the economy’s aggregate budget constraint, and the 
summation result corresponds to Walras’ law. General equilibrium is typically defined as a 
situation, in which demand equals supply in all markets. Another, more stringent definition 
allows for excess supply in a number of markets, but in this case the equilibrium price in these   8
markets must be zero. Equation (6) shows that if one market is in equilibrium, then the other 
market must also be in equilibrium. This means, in the n-market case, that there are only n-1 
independent markets but n prices. This is why Walras used one good as numraire with a price 
equal to one. The trick works since the demand and supply functions are homogenous of 
degree zero, i.e., doubling all prices does not change firms’ and consumers’ optimal decisions. 
Firms an consumers lack money illusion. 
 
Now, if we scale everything with the inverse of the price for goods, we can determine the 
relative price,  / wp ω = , either by equating the demand and supply of goods or by equating 
the demand and supply of labor.  Say that we solve for the equilibrium price by equating 
demand and supply in the market for goods: 
 
() (




     (7) 
 
where    is the equilibrium real wage, which can be used to solve for all variables in 




In the diagram below we illustrate the equilibrium in our Robison Cruse Economy. On the 
vertical axis we measure the demand and supply of goods and on the horizontal axis the 
supply and demand of labor. The concave production function is illustrated by the curve OP, 
and the convex indifference curves are denoted A, B, and C. The arrow in the diagram points 
out the direction of increasing utility. The curve denoted B has a common point with the 
production function, and through that point the straight line  () y π ωω = + is tangent to both 
the indifference curve and the production function. This straight line corresponds to the 
economy’s aggregate budget constraint. The slope of the line is the real wage rate in 
equilibrium.  
   9
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                Figure 1: The Competitive Equilibrium 
 
In Figure 1, the competitive equilibrium is given by the point ( , ) lx
∗ ∗ , which is assumed to be 
unique. However, uniqueness is not generally true, and an equilibrium may not even exist (see 
the survey on General Equilibrium Theory for details). For the equilibrium to exist in the case 
under consideration it is not necessary that the utility function is strictly concave. It is enough 
that the set above an indifference curve is a strictly convex set, which is the case in the figure. 
 
It is also obvious from the geometry that the equilibrium point maximizes utility. We will, 
however, shortly move to the First and Second Welfare Theorems. To produce more general 
theorems, we need a more general model than a Robinson Cruse Economy. 
 
The Determination of the absolute price level 
 
The reader may wonder how absolute prices are determined. Monetary theory is a well-
developed branch of economics, and it would take us too far to go into any details. We briefly 
present a classical way to determine the price level called the Quantity Theory of Money. The 
underlying idea is that the quantity of money matters for normal but not for real entities. The 
theory is extremely old. The economic writer that is considered to be the modern “Father of 
the Quantity Theory” is the Italian Benardo Davanzati (1588).   10
 
In the context of our simple general equilibrium model, the following equation system 











The left hand side of the first equation is the total value of goods in circulation, i.e., wage 
income plus the nominal value of consumption. The right hand side contains the stock of 
money times the velocity of circulation. Both entities are exogenously determined. The 
second equation is the definition of real wage in general equilibrium. Entities which have a 
star for the index are equilibrium values that are determined in the real part of the economy. It 













       
 
Note that the prices are proportional to the quantity of money, and that increased money 
supply does not affect the real entities. 
 
3. Cost Benefit Analysis of Small Projects in General Equilibrium 
 
The model discussed so far may seem simple, but it can be used to illustrate many 
fundamental insights in Welfare Economics. One key insight is determining what a cost-
benefit rule will look like in a situation, in which all general equilibrium effects have been 
accounted for. The partial equilibrium version was first introduced by Dupuit (1844), in which 
he studied the value of a large project. Being an engineer educated at Ecole Polytechnique in 
Paris, he was confronted every day with the question of how public investments such as 
highways, bridges and canals should be evaluated. He looked for a measure of the utility of 
public works and ended up with an aggregate demand curve in a utility metrics, the area under 
which constituted the total willingness to pay. Taking away the value of exchange () px left 
the consumer surplus. In addition, Dupuit understood the excess burden of taxation, i.e., that 
the tax payer is willing to pay more than the tax revenue to get rid of the tax.   11
 
The cost benefit rule that we will handle in this section is a marginal project represented by a 
parameter, α , which enters the model in the production function in the following manner 
 
0 (; )










i.e., a marginal increase in the parameter from its initial value increases the productivity in the 








, with  0 ()0 c α = . The profit of the firm can now be written as 
 
0 (; ) ( ) pf l wl c 0 π α =− − α      (8) 
 
If we are starting at the Walrasian equilibrium with ll
∗ =  and  0 α α = , the impact effect for 
the firm of a small increase in α  can be written as 
 
00 (; ) (; ) ( ) lf l c
p





     (9) 
 
The reader should note that  0 (,; ) ll p w α
∗ =  is also a function of the parameter α ; however, 
the resulting welfare effect vanishes because l is optimally chosen (the first order condition 




The optimal value function of the consumer (and technically also the whole economy since 
there is only one individual) can now be written 
 
00 00 0 [ () , () , ( () , () ,) V V pw pw α απ α αα =         (10) 
 
 The project that is inherent in equation (9) can now be evaluated by totally differentiating the 
value function with respect to the parameterα . We obtain: 
   12
[] []
dV V V p V V w V
dp p w w
π ππ
α πα πα π
∂∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
=+ ++ +
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ α
   (11) 
 
This expression is at first sight a bit complicated, but by using two of the most well-known 
results in microeconomic theory, Hotelling’s Lemma and Roy’s Identity, it can be greatly 
simplified. Hotelling’s lemma tells us that the derivative of the optimal profit function with 
















     (12) 
 
In other words, differentiating with respect to the output price produces the supply function, 
and differentiating with respect to the input price results in the negative of the demand 
function for the input.  
 






























 is the marginal utility of  (profit) income. It is also the Lagrange multiplier of 
the budget constraint in the consumer’s optimization problem. In other words, the derivative 
of the optimal value function with respect to  p equals minus the marginal utility of income 
times the demand function for consumption goods. The derivative of the optimal value 
function with respect to the wage rate equals the marginal utility of income times the labor 
supply function. 
 
We can now use these insights to rewrite equation (11) in the following manner: 
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() ( )











   (14) 
 
The last equality follows since supply equals demand in all market in general equilibrium. 
The result means that for a small project, the impact effect on profits given by equation (9) is 
enough to value a project, and all effects of the project are valued at ruling general 
equilibrium prices. The project is profitable (welfare improving) iff equation (14) is positive. 
 
Hotelling’s Lemma and Roy’s Identity are special cases of a more general theorem called the 
Envelope Theorem
7. It tells us that for any optimal value function, the derivative of the 
optimal value function with respect to a parameter of the problem is equal to the partial 
derivative of the parameter at the optimal control vector. Say that we have an optimal value 
function () (() ,) yf x α αα = . The total derivative of this value function with respect to the 
parameter is obtained by 
 
() xx
df f x f f















 at the optimum. Hence, we could have moved directly to (14) from (11), 
but the detour was hopefully instructive. The fact that we start from a general equilibrium 
means that we can skip the effects that are created from changing prices. Note also that the 
marginal utility of income in equation (14) is positive so we can express the rule in a money 
metrics by dividing through withλ .       
 
4. The First and Second Welfare Theorem 
 
To be able to thoroughly address the two welfare theorems, we need a more general model. 
We need, in particular, a model which contains more than one individual. However, to avoid 
some technicalities, we skip production and do the analysis by equipping the agents with an 
initial endowment of goods that is traded. We also need more agents to make it reasonable to 
assume that each agent takes the prices as given; i.e., takes the market prices as independent 
of his/her own actions. One way to do this rigorously is to assume that there is a continuum of   14
agents, but a short cut is to assume that they treat prices as exogenous. There are today many 
proofs and versions of the two welfare theorems. The analysis below follows Varian (1994).  
 
Notation 
An individual (agent) is described by his ordinal preference or his utility function  . The 
vector 
( ) i u i x
12 ( , ,..., )
n
ii i x xx = i x  is the commodity bundle that is consumed, or potentially consumed, 
by individual i, and 
j
i x  is the consumption of commodity j. Because individual preferences 
are ordinal, commodity bundles can be ranked. However, the utility metrics neither means 
that the utility levels tell us something about the absolute difference in utilils, nor that any two 
person’s utility levels can be compared.  
 
For any two commodity bundles   and  , the statement that   is preferred to or indifferent 
to    is written 
i x
,
i x i x
,
i x i R
,
i xx i . More generally (and if we neglect subscripts to simplify notations), 
the fact that any two alternatives can be compared can be written: 
 
Axiom 1: For all x and y, either  R x y or  R y x. (the completeness axiom) 
 
The mathematical term for a preference ordering that satisfies Axiom 1 is that it is complete 
(in one piece, without holes). We also need some consistence between different pairs of 
alternatives. More specifically if x is preferred or indifferent to y and  y is indifferent or 
preferred to z, then x is indifferent or preferred to z. More formally: 
 
Axiom 2: For all x, y, and z, xRy and yRz, imply xRz. (the transitivity axiom) 
 
A preference ordering satisfying Axiom 2 is said to be transitive. A preference ordering 
satisfying both axioms is called a weak ordering. It is typically not possible to use a weak 
ordering to completely characterize a preference pattern. We need to introduce the possibility 
to handle that x is strictly preferred to y. To accomplish this, we introduce the following 
definition: 
 
Definition 1: xPy means that not yRx. 
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xPy is read x is preferred to y. We also introduce the following definition of indifference:  
 
Definition 2: xIy means xRy and yRx .    
 
I x y  is read x is indifferent to y. 
 
We can use the two axioms and the two definitions to prove important statements, some 
seemingly intuitive, about relationships within the preference ordering. For example, that 
P x y and  , R y z implies  . To prove this, suppose that P xz R zx . From Axiom 2 it follows that 
R y z and  R zx ,  hence  R y x from transivity. However, according to Definition 1,   P x y 
implies not   R y x, a contradiction that proves the claim. 
 
We will for the moment use a continuous utility function to represent the ordinal preference 
ordering of the individuals. This means, however, that the value of utility as such has no 
meaning in the sense that the ranking of commodity bundles will be the same under any 
strictly monotone transformation of the utility function  , i.e., the ranking is preserved if 
we introduce a utility function  ,   
( ) ii u x
( ( )) i Fu x
'() 0 Fu>
 
Assuming  n goods and N individuals with utility function  , and initial 
endowments  , we can find out how the individual chooses the most preferred 
commodity bundle by solving the following maximization problem:  
( ), ,..., ii ui i = x N
1 ( ,..., )
n
ii i zz = z
 








            (16) 
Here top index T means transpose, and  1 ( ,..., ) n p p = p  is the ruling price vector for the n-
goods. Since it is fairly self evident that vector products contain a transpose, we will save 
notational clutter by skipping this notational precision.  
 
If the problem is well behaved, the solution will be the continuous demand functions 
, which are similar to the ones introduced in section 2 above. The only thing that is  (, ) i xp p z i  16
different is that they contain the value of the initial endowment instead of the profit as an 
income argument. To be able to handle the technicalities, we need a few additional 
definitions. 
 
Definition 3: An allocation   is a vector of consumption bundles, whose 
elements are the consumption vectors at the individual level. 
12 ( , ,..., ) N = xx x x
 
Definition 4: A feasible allocation in the exchange economy is an allocation that is physically 





≤ ∑ ∑ xz  . 
 
For the particular exchange economy represented by the N maximization problems in 
equation (16) we define a Walrasian equilibrium in the following general manner: 
 
Definition 5: A Walrasian equilibrium is a pair ( ,








≤ ∑ ∑ i xpp z z, 




The weak inequality means that a Walrasian equilibrium is characterized by a price vector,  
, such that there is no market where there is an excess demand. It is, of course natural to 
think about a Walrasian equilibrium as a price vector that clears all markets, but Definition 5 




We have previously introduced Walras’ law, and that it is valid also for he exchange economy 
under consideration follows directly from the optimization problem in equation (16). To see 
this, define the excess demand vector as 
1




i = − ∑ i y px p p z z
i
. Clearly  , since 
 holds for all N optimization problems in equation (16). Moreover, if 
) 0 = py(p
i = px pz ()0 j y <
* p for 
some market j, it must hold that . This follows directly from the definition of Walrasian 
equilibrium and Walras law.  We can arrange for excess demand equal to zero in all markets 
in a Walrasian equilibrium by assuming that all goods are desirable in the sense that if 
0 j
∗ = p
0 j p =    17
then  . The reason is that if ( ) 0 j y > p ()0 j y
∗ < p , then by the free good assumption 0 i p
∗ = . 
However, this contradicts that all goods are desirable,  .  ()0 j yp
∗ >
 
To simplify the proofs below we will assume that all goods are desirable and define a 
Walrasian equilibrium   in the following manner:  ( , )
∗ * xp
 



















xx p x p z
  
 
The second point means that it costs more for consumer i to buy a strictly preferred vector. 
 
We will not spend time on proving the existence of equilibrium, but just mention that this can 
be proved by assuming that  ) y(p is a continuous function, and that Walras’ law holds. We 
will instead introduce a definition of Pareto Efficiency. 
 
Definition 7: A feasible allocation   is Pareto efficient if there is no allocation  such that all 






By “weakly prefer”, we mean in the notation we just introduced that  i R
, xx  all i. And that an 
agent  j  strictly prefers   to can be written .  
, x x j P
, xx
 
We are now ready to produce proofs of the First and Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem. 
 
Theorem 1: If  is a Walrasian Equilibrium, then the allocation x is Pareto efficient       ( , ) xp
 
Proof: Suppose not, and let   be a feasible allocation that all agents are indifferent to or 
prefer to ,  and at least one agent prefer to .  Then by property (ii)  of the definition of 
Walrasian equilibrium, we have 
, x
x x
(A)   for all i, and  i ≥
,
i px pz p p >
,
i x i z  for at least one i.    18
















ii pzpxpz  
which contradicts feasibility. This proves the theorem. 
 
In Figure 2 below, we illustrate the set of Pareto optimal allocations in an Edgeworth box, 
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             Figure 2: Pareto Optimal Allocations in the Edgeworth Box   
     
 
Consumer 1’s indifference curves are increasing in utility when one moves in the north 
eastern direction in the box, while Consumer 2 benefits from moves in the south west 
direction. The curve OA (the contract curve) is the locus of points where the Consumers’ 
indifference curves are tangent to each other. This means that at a point on the curve, e.g.,  , 
it is impossible to increase the utility of  one consumer without decreasing the utility of the 
1 P  19
other. Given an initial endowment, i.e. the coordinates (  where two indifference curve 
cross, it is obvious that the allocation can be improved for both individuals. 
, ) HI
 
To prove a general version of the Second Welfare Theorem we need a more involved proof, 
and we have chosen to introduce a less general version that allows us use a brief proof. The 
condition we introduce that simplifies the proof is to assume that a Walrasian (competitive) 
equilibrium exists.  
 
Theorem 2: Suppose   is a Pareto efficient allocation, that preferences are non-satiated, and 
that a Walrasian equilibrium exists from the initial endowment 
* x
, ii
∗ = zx  for all i. Denote this 
equilibrium  . Then   is a Walrasian equilibrium. 
,, (,) px ( , )
,* px
 
Proof: Since  i x
∗  is feasible by construction, we know that
,
iii R
∗ xx  all i. Since x




∗. Thus both vectors provide maximum utility on the budget set. 
Hence, 
, (,) p x
∗  is a Walrasian equilibrium.  
 
Remark:  Non-satiated means that you locally always can find a preferred consumption 
bundle, i.e., indifference curves are not thick lines. 
 
A competitive equilibrium exists if excess demand functions are continuous. This can be fixed 
by assuming that preferences are strictly convex, continuous, and monotonic. Strict convexity 
means that if the consumer has the ranking  ii R i x y  and  i R
,
i x y , then the vector 
[( 1 ) ] i tt +−
'
ii xx P i y , for 0 . In other words, if both   and   are preferred, or indifferent 
to
1 t << i x
,
i x
i y , then all points along a straight line between   and   are strictly preferred to i x
,
i x i y . That 
the preferences are continuous means, loosely speaking, that if a sequence of consumption 
bundles (  that all are preferred to a bundle  ) i x i y   converges to a consumption bundle , then 
the latter is also preferred to
*
i x
i y . Finally, monotonicity means that if i ≥ x i y , and,  ii ≠ xy , 
then i P x i y . Intuitively speaking, a little more of something is always better than status quo. 
Hence, Theorem 2 can be rephrased in the following manner: 
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Theorem 2a: Suppose   is a Pareto efficient allocation with   all i, and preferences 
are convex, continuous and monotonic. Then 




∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium for the initial 
endowment , all i.   i
∗ = zx i
 
The notation   means that every component of the vector is greater than zero. A proof 
of Theorem 2a is available in Varian (1994) Chapter 13.     
0 >> i x
 
Note here that this means that an initial non-efficient endowment can be reallocated to fit any 
Pareto-optimum. Hence, all points along the contract curve inside the Edgeworth box in 
Figure 2 can be reached by lump sum transfers of the initial endowment and a suitable price 
vector. 
 



























Figure 3: The Walrasian Equilibrium and the Core  
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Starting from the initial allocation,   in the Edgewoth box in Figure 3, there is, however, 
only a small part in the lens between the indifference curves A and B, where the Walrasian 
equilibrium can end up. This is the segment ab of the contract curve AB. Why is this? The 
reason is simple. Neither trader would accept trades that move them to a lower utility level. At 
point w, (the Walrasian equilibrium) on the contract curve all mutually advantageous trades 
are exhausted and the economy has reached a Pareto optimum. The slope of the line between 
 and w is the Walrasian equilibrium (relative) price vector. The segment ab of the contract 
curve is called the Core  of the market economy, and in this case, two goods and two 
consumers, the Walrasian equilibrium belongs to the Core, and all points in the Core are 
Pareto efficient allocations. We now show that this is true in a more general context. We start 




Definition 8: A group of agents S (a coalition S) is said to improve upon a given allocation   
if there is some allocation   such that  
x
, x






(ii)   is preferred to   for all i
,
i x i x S ∈ . 
 
Now we use Definition 8 to define the Core of a market economy. 
 
Definition 9: A feasible allocation   is in the Core of the economy if it cannot be improved 
upon by any coalition. 
x
 
The allocations on the segment ab in Figure 3 all belong to the Core, since it cannot be 
improved upon by the grand coalition consisting of two agents, or the singleton coalitions at 
the initial endowment.  
 
We can now prove the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 3: If    is a Walrasian equilibrium from an initial endowment  , then the 




   22
Proof: Assume not; then there is some coalition S and some feasible allocation   such that 








= ∑∑ i xz  
The definition of a Walrasian equilibrium,  
∗ x , implies that   all  , i.e., it costs 
more than the initial endowment at general equilibrium prices. Summing yields 
, violating feasibility. The contradiction proves the theorem. 
ii










5. Gains From Free Trade    
 
That the Walrasian equilibrium belongs to the allocation that cannot be improved upon is 
based on two fundamental properties of a competitive market. The first is that the agents trade 
if and only if the trades are mutually advantageous. The second is that in a competitive 
equilibrium all mutually advantageous trades are exhausted. These properties may also help 
us understand that there are gains from free trade compared to autarky. In this section, we 
show, using tools from modern trade theory, that Robinson Cruse would have gained from 
free trade. 
 
Let us start with some preliminaries. Assume that Robinson has a utility function  (, )
s uxz l − , 
where  z  is the fixed initial endowment of leisure time. The utility function is assumed to be 
increasing in consumption and leisure time. This is only a slight modification of the model in 
section 2. Here we are more explicit about leisure time,
s zl − .  
 
Instead of maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint like in section 2, we introduce a 
new concept, the expenditure function defined by the following minimization problem: 
 
,




epwu p x wz l =+ −  
subject  to         (17) 
 
(, )
s uxz l u −≥    23
 
In words, the expenditure function gives us the minimum expenditure Robinson needs to 
reach utility level u . Clearly, the higher the utility level the more income is needed to reach 
it. Technically speaking, the expenditure function is increasing inu . It is also increasing in 
and  w . p   
 
Robinson is also a producer, and the revenues that are produced are maximized subject to the 
given production technology he uses, i.e.: 
 
,










pxw l w z −+    
subject  to       (18) 
 
()
s x fl =  
 
The function  (,,) R pwz  is called the revenue function, but note that the resulting supply of 
goods and the demand for labor coincide with the quantities that maximize profit, since wz  is 
a constant. The revenue function is increasing in   and w p . Moreover, from the Envelope 






































     (20) 
 
Equations (19) are called the compensated (Hicksian) demand (supply) functions since they 
are conditioned on a given utility level.  
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A competitive equilibrium corresponding to the one in section 2 can now be defined by a 
vector ( , , ) p wu
∗∗ ∗  such that 
 
(,, ) (,,, ) R pwz e pwuz
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ =      (21) 
 
Equation (21) tells us that optimal (maximum) revenue equals optimal (minimum) cost. 
Therefore, the vector that maximizes profit helps us to reach the equilibrium utility level at 
minimum cost (efficiently). 
 
We are now ready to prove the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 4: Free trade can be no worse than autarky.  
 
Proof: Suppose that autarky equilibrium is given by  (, )
as
a cx z l a = −  and  . Let 
be the equilibrium price vector under free trade, and   the corresponding utility 
level. By using the properties of the expenditure and revenue functions we can come up with 
the following series of weak inequalities:  . Now, 
, since the expenditure function is increasing in u . This proves the claim. 
( )





tt Pp w =
t u
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
ta t a t tt eP u Pc RP T eP u ≤≤ =
t uu ≥
 
Remarks: The first weak inequality follows by the definition of the expenditure function. It 
says that the autarky utility level can be obtained more economically at trade prices. The 
second weak inequality follows by definition of the revenue function, and the final part 
follows by the equality between the revenue and expenditure functions in equilibrium. The 
duality approach introduced in connection with Theorem 4 was popularized in the monograph 
by Dixit and Norman (1980) 
 
There are also two other important points to be made. The first is that the price vector  must 
be different from the equilibrium price vector under autarky,  to generate trade. The 
second is that Robinson has to be able to trade (sell or buy) labor and goods. If the two price 
vectors coincide, Robinson would remain satisfied with the autarky equilibrium. With respect 
to the second point, we know from Section 2 that there is only one relevant price in this 
t P
,
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simple model, the real wage rate, 
w
p
 . The two possibilities for trade are   
and    . In the first case, Robinson would like to produce more goods by 
importing cheap labor (Friday?), and then sell these goods in the international market. In this 
manner he would get more leisure time for himself for the same (or smaller) amount of goods 
than under autarky. In the second case, he would like to produce a smaller amount of goods at 
home than under autarky and sell his labor in the international market; furthermore, he would 
like to buy cheap goods in the international market. In the new equilibrium, he would have 
less leisure time and more goods than under autarky. Therefore, and depending on the 
compensation Friday wants, he might be able to do even better by sending him to the 
international market. However, as neither Robinson nor Friday can leave the island, both 
cases are impossible; they just illustrate how hampering for welfare barriers to trade might be. 
( / ) ( / )
at wp wp >
( / ) ( / )
a wp wp <
t
 
Theorem 4 is valid for any number of goods, but adding more consumers creates 
distributional complications, which we would need some kind of welfare function to handle. 
We therefore turn to distributional issues and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (or the Third 
Fundamental Welfare Theorem) to see if such a function exists. 
 
6. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem                    
 
The Second Welfare theorem (Theorem 2 above) raises an important question: Which one of 
the many possible Pareto efficient allocations should be chosen?  Or almost equivalently, 
what should the income distribution look like, and how should it be chosen? A commonly 
used method to choose between alternatives is majority voting, but it has long been known 
that it has an important flaw. The flaw is called the voting paradox. It has been known since 
Markis de Condorcet’s published his Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a’ la Probablite’ 
des Decisions Rendue a’ la Pluralite’ des Voix in 1785. It was also mentioned by the 
Auastralian E.J Nansen hundred years later (1882), and taken up by the political scientist 
Duncan Black in 1948. 
 
The standard illustration of it assumes three individuals and three alternatives. The three 
voters have the following preferences: 
(1) x  y  z            
(2) y  z  x   26
(3) z  x  y 
The alternatives are listed in the order they rank from left to right. Majority voting between 
each pair of alternatives shows that x wins over y and y wins over z, but surprisingly also z 
wins over x. Such voting cycles means that we cannot use a majority rule to solve the 
distributional problem. A possible alternative is to introduce a Bergsonian Welfare Function, 
where the individual utility functions are weighted arguments. “Evil people” say that this is a 
roundabout way to discover Pareto efficiency, or, if enough detail is added, a method to 
discover the constructor’s preferences. We will, nevertheless, use such welfare functions in 
later sections. 
 
Arrow asks how individual preference orderings can be transferred into a social preference 
ordering. Technically, he asks for a mapping of individual orderings into a social ordering; 
 
12 ( , ,..., ) n TRR R R →        (22)   
 
To be able to move beyond weak orderings like Pareto optimality, the social ordering R   must 
be able to rank all alternatives,  and to avoid cycles like the voting paradox it must be 
transitive. In other words, it must fulfill Axioms 1 and 2 in section 5, i.e. completeness and 
transitivity.  But this is not enough; more structure has to be added to make the transformation 
in equation (22) reasonable for social choice.  
 
Arrow (1951) introduced some reasonable constraints or conditions that the social preference 
ordering has to satisfy. Here we will use a modified (stronger) version of Arrow’s axioms, to 
be able to prove a simplified version of Arrows Impossibility Theorem. The following 
axioms, which were introduced by Sen (1970), constitute a condensed version of the 
conditions that were imposed by Arrow (1951): 
 
(1) Universality (Completeness): The function T is a function of individual preferences and 
should always be able to rank alternatives independently of the shape of the preferences of the 
individuals.   
 
(2) Pareto consistency: If all individuals prefer x to y society should prefer x to y 
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(3) Neutrality-Independence-Monotonicity: Assume all individuals in a set S prefer x to y, 
all individuals not in S prefer y to x, and society prefers x to y. Then society must prefer x to y 
for any preference profile that fulfills the condition that all individuals in S prefer x to y 
 
 
(4) Non-dictatorship: There is no individual i such that  i xRy implies xRy  independent of 
the preferences of all other individuals. 
 
 
The first condition tells us that there can be no “holes” in the social preference ordering. 
Society must be able to rank any two alternatives. The second seems very reasonable indeed. 
If it does not hold, society’s preferences could be imposed by outsiders. The third condition is 
not innocuous, and a strengthening of a condition that Arrow referred to as Independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. Loosely speaking, the latter means that if there are two preference 
orderings under which all individuals prefer x to y, then if society prefers x to y, it will do so 
independently of how individuals rank a third alternative z (for example in relation to x and 
y). This assumption has been criticized, but the attempts to weaken it have also been criticized 
and not able to change the Impossibility Theorem into a consistent and credible welfare 
function. 
 
It is worth noting that the market mechanism also operates independently of irrelevant 
alternatives. To see this, assume that we alter individual preferences for alternatives that are 
socially infeasible which, in turn, will not change the competitive equilibrium. Hence, a 
competitive equilibrium must, given the Impossibility Theorem, violate some other 
condition(s). In Arrow’s original setting, it violates a condition that he calls “collective 
rationality” meaning that society’s indifference curves are not allowed to cross.  
 
We are now ready to prove a version of the Impossibility Theorem. The proof has been 
borrowed from Allan F. Feldman in an essay on Welfare Economics published in The New 
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1988, Volume Q-Z. To that end we introduce the 
following definition: 
 
Definition 10: A group of individuals, S, is called decisive whenever all people in S prefer x to 
y, society prefers x to y.  
 
We can write the Impossibility Theorem as follows:   28
 
Theorem 5: There is no welfare function   that satisfies conditions (1)-(4).  12 (, , . . .) n TRR R
 
Proof: We start by observing that there always exist a decisive group of individuals, since by 
the Pareto consistency condition the set of all individuals (society) is one. Let us now assume 
that S is a decisive set of individuals of minimal size. If S contains only one individual he is a 
dictator, and this violates Condition 4. Hence, we assume the decisive group S contains more 
than one individual and divide S into two non-empty sets    and   We denote by  all 
individuals who are in neither , nor . 
1 S 2 S. 3 S
1 S 2 S
 
By Universality the function   has to be applicable to any profile of individual 
preferences. Assume that the three group of voters have the following preferences: 
( ) T •
For individuals in group :   x   y   z             1 S
For individuals in group :   y   z   x  2 S
For individuals in group :  z   x   y  3 S
Since S is decisive yPz . From Completeness either xRy  or yPx. If  xRy ,  yPz  and transitivity 




If , then   is decisive, contradicting that S is the minimal decisive group. Hence, any 
attempt to avoid a dictator will result in contradiction. This means that   contains only one 




A lot of effort has been spent on attempts to weaken the conditions the social ordering must 
satisfy aiming at a “Possibility Theorem”, but no unanimous conclusion has yet been reached. 
However, Duncan Black in his revival of the voting paradox in 1948 came up with an 
application that solved the problem in a special case. He was a Political Scientist and noted 
that political preferences are often single peaked; i.e. on a left right scale your preferences are 
such that of two parties to your left (right ) you have the strongest preference for the party that 
is the one less to the left (right). More precisely, he assumes that if    are utility 
indicators for the individual orderings
1, 2,..., n UU U
12 , ,..., n R RR , then the alternative social states can be   29
represented by a one-dimensional variable in such a way that each of the graphs of   
 has a single peak. Arrow (1951) mentions an economic example in terms of a 
working time leisure trade off.  He assumes that, for reasons of technological efficiency, all 
workers work the same number of hours, and the more hours work the lower the marginal 
product of work and consequently the real wage rate. This means that each social alternative 
is given by a single number, the hours worked. Given the typical shape of indifference curves; 
the closer (on either side) the tradeoffs are to the optimum, the higher the utility. Hence, 
individual preferences are single peaked. 
12 , ,..., n UU U
 
Black shows that under his assumption of single-peaked preferences, majority decision will 
avoid cycles, and there is exactly one alternative that will receive a majority over any other 
alternative, provided that the number of voters is odd. He assumes a finite number of 





So far, we have discussed the properties of a competitive equilibrium. We have seen (among 
other things) that a competitive equilibrium is a Pareto efficient resource allocation, and that a 
Pareto efficient resource allocation can be supported by competitive prices. This section 
extends the analysis to market failures, which will be exemplified by consumption 
externalities associated with environmental damage. Therefore, without appropriate policies 
to correct for this market failure, the decentralized resource allocation is no longer necessarily 
efficient. 
 
Let us once again use the model set out above, while modifying it appropriately to capture the 
consequences of consumption externalities. Consider an economy with n identical individuals. 
The utility function facing each individual is written as 
 
        ( 2 3 )   (,,) uu c z e =
 
where c and z refer to private consumption and leisure, respectively, while e measures the 
environmental damage, which is treated as exogenous by each individual. Leisure is defined   30
as a time endowment less the time spent in market work, l. The function   is increasing in c 
and z, decreasing in e and strictly quasiconcave. We also assume that 
() u ⋅
en c = , meaning that the 
aggregate consumption causes environmental damage. 
 
As we are focusing on consumption externalities, which are generated by the consumption 
behavior, the production sector plays no important role in the analysis here. We will, 
therefore, simplify by considering a linear technology, where the wage rate is fixed. This 
means that the resource constraint for the economy as a whole (i.e. the constraint on the 
consumption possibilities) can be written as 
 
        ( 2 4 )   0 nwl nc −=
 
where  w is the wage rate. In Section 10, where we consider a consumption externality 
generated by production, we return to the more general formulation of the production 
technology used before. 
 
In this simple economy, in which all individuals are identical, it is natural to assume the social 
welfare function (which is denoted by W throughout this section) is utilitarian, so Wn u = . 
Therefore, we can write the Lagrangean corresponding to the social optimization problem as 
 
 [] LW n w lc γ =+ −      (25) 
 
The first order conditions for c and l become 
 
 (,,) 0 ce uc z e u nγ + −=     (26) 
 (,,) 0 z uc z e w γ −+ =      (27) 
 
Equations (24), (26) and (27) together with the relationship en c =  define the socially optimal 
resource allocation, which is denoted 
**** (,,, ) czeγ . 
 
However, the socially optimal resource allocation is not automatically achieved in the market 
economy. The reason is that each individual treats e as exogenous and, therefore, disregards 
the negative impact of his/her consumption on the utility of other individuals. In a   31
decentralized economy, each individual chooses c and l to maximize the utility given by 
equation (23) subject to the budget constraint 
 
       (28)  (1 ) 0 wl c t R −+ + =
 
where t is a consumption tax and R a lump-sum transfer, which are treated as exogenous by 
the individual. Note also that, as the only role of the public sector in this model is to 
internalize externalities, the public budget constraint becomes tc=R. 
 
In an uncontrolled market economy, where t=0, the first order conditions for the individual 
read 
 
 (,,) 0 c uc z e γ − =      (29) 
 (,,) 0 z uc z e w γ −+ =      (30) 
 
By comparing equations (26) and (29), it is clear that the first order condition for private 
consumption in the uncontrolled market economy differs from its counterpart in the social 
optimization problem. 
 
However, by reintroducing the consumption tax mentioned above, and repaying the tax 
revenues lump-sum to the consumer, the first order condition for consumption obeyed by each 
individual changes to read 
 
 (,,) ( 1 ) 0 c uc z e t γ − +=     (31) 
 
Therefore, by choosing this consumption tax in a particular way, we can reproduce the social 









it is clear that equation (31) becomes equivalent to equation (26). In other words, the social 
optimum, i.e. 
**** (,,, ) czeγ , obeys the first order conditions derived in the decentralized   32
economy. This means that the externality has become fully internalized, and the tax used to 
reach the social optimum exemplifies the concept of ‘Pigouvian’ tax discussed in the 
introduction. We will return to externalities and Pigouvian taxes in Section 10 in the context 
of an intertemporal model. 
 
8. Public Goods 
 
Private goods are typically described as rival and excludable. Rivalry means that there is 
rivalry over consumption in the sense that the amount consumed by each individual cannot be 
consumed by anyone else, whereas excludability implies that the owner of a unit of the good 
can exclude others from enjoying the benefits of its consumption. A pure public good, on the 
other hand, is described as non-rival and non-excludable. We shall in this section briefly 
discuss public goods and, in particular, how the optimality condition for a public good 
depends on the tax instruments used to raise revenue. We start with the famous Samuleson 
Rule, which gives the optimality condition for provision of a public good in a first best 
framework, and then continue by discussing (some of) the consequences of distortionary 
finance. As a final concern, we address public good provision and redistribution 
simultaneously by introducing asymmetric information between the private sector and the 
government. 
 
8.1 Public Provision in the First Best: The Samuelson Rule 
 
We use a slightly modified version of the model examined in Section 7. As before, we assume 
that the production technology is linear (nothing essential is lost by this simplification), and 
that all consumers are identical. The latter assumption will be relaxed in subsection 8.3, where 
we also consider distributional aspects of public policy. 
 
The utility function facing each individual is given by 
 
        ( 3 2 )   (,, ) uu c z g =
 
where  c and z  have the same interpretations as before, whereas g is a pure public good 
provided by the government (or social planner).   The resource constraint changes to read 
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 0      (33)  nwl nc g κ −− =
 
where   is interpretable as a fixed resource cost of providing a unit of the public good 
measured in terms of lost private consumption. In other words, 
κ
κ  measures the marginal rate 
of transformation between the public good and the private consumption good. Many earlier 
studies normalize   to one; however, for illustrative purposes, and to be able to distinguish 
different components of the marginal cost of providing public goods in the next subsection, 
we use this explicit notation in what follows. 
κ
 
Once again, as the individuals are identical, we assume the social welfare function is 
utilitarian, so W . The social optimization problem will be to maximize the social 
welfare function subject to the resource constraint given by equation (33). If 
n u =
γ  is used to 
denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint, the additional first 
order conditions can be written as 
 
 (,, ) 0 c uc z g γ −=     (34) 
 (,, ) 0 z uc z g w γ −+ =      (35) 
  (,, ) 0 g nu c z g γκ −=      (36) 
 
By combining equations (34) and (36), we can immediately deduce the following rule for the 
public good, which is typically referred to as the Samuelson Rule (Samuelson (1954)); 
 
  , gc nMRS κ =     (37) 
 
where  , (,, ) / (,, ) gc g c MRS u c z g u c z g = . The Samuelson Rule is a first best policy rule for 
public provision; it presupposes that the government or social planner can collect revenue by 
using lump-sum taxes. This condition would take the same form in an economy with 
heterogeneous consumers, provided that the government can use individual-specific lump-
sum taxes. It means that the public good should be provided up to a point where the sum of 
marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the private consumption good 
equals the marginal rate of transformation between these goods. The sum of marginal rates of 
substitution is interpretable in terms of the sum of marginal willingness to pay for the public   34
goods by the beneficiaries (note that all individuals benefit from the public good by 
assumption), measured in terms of lost private consumption, whereas the marginal rate of 
transformation is the marginal production cost. 
 
So far, we have assumed that the public good is provided by the government. Is it possible to 
design a ‘price system’, such that the consumers, themselves, would choose an efficient 
amount of the public good in the context of a market? Without government intervention, the 
economy would most likely end up with inefficiently low public good provision. The reason 
is that each individual does not necessarily consider that his/her choice to contribute to the 
public good also affects the utility of others. Therefore, to reproduce equation (37), the 
government would have to subsidize the consumers. These subsidies are, in turn, related to the 
concept of Lindahl prices; see Lindahl (1919) and endnote 8. To illustrate, let us write the 
budget constraint facing each consumer as 
 
    (1 ) 0 wl T c s g κ −−−− = (
 
where T is a lump-sum tax,   the individual contribution and s the subsidy rate. Therefore, 
budget balance from the perspective of the government implies 
g (













** * * * *
, (,, ) / (,, ) gc g c
* MR S uczg uczg =  is defined by equation (37), which is part of the 
outcome of the first best social planner problem discussed above. Then, if each individual 
were to choose c, l and   to maximize utility subject to the hypothetical budget constraint 
given above, while treating the contributions by others as exogenous, it is easy to show that 
the first order conditions are given by equations (34), (35) and (36). 
g (
 
However, the reader should bear in mind that a large step still remains between theory and 
application; eliciting the willingness to pay for a public good is by no means a trivial 
empirical problem. The reason is, of course, that if the individuals were asked to state their 
willingness to pay, each of them may have incentives report a value that differs from the true   35
willingness to pay. A mechanism that is designed to elicit the true willingness to pay – known 
as the Clarke-Groves Mechanism (Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)) – means that a system of 
side-payments is introduced to the individual alongside the willingness to pay question. To be 
more specific, each individual is asked to report a bid measuring his/her willingness to 
contribute to (i.e. willingness to pay for) the public good, and the individual is, at the same 
time, informed that he/she will receive a payment equal to the sum of the other bids if the 
public good is provided (if this sum is positive, the individual receives it; if it is negative, the 
individual must pay this amount). The system of side-payments implies that the level of the 
public good preferred by the individual is governed by the sum of his/her own willingness to 
pay and the other bids. Therefore, an interesting property of the side-payment is that, if all 
agents were to report bids that coincide with the true willingness to pay, the benefit of the 
public good perceived by each individual would be equal to the benefit for the society as a 
whole. The contribution of the Clarke-Groves Mechanism is then to ensure that reporting the 




8.2 Distortionary Revenue Collection 
 
A long time ago, Pigou (1947) claimed that the rule for public provision summarized by 
equation (37) – which only recognizes the direct marginal benefit and production cost - does 
not apply if the public revenues are raised by distortionary taxes. The argument is simple; in 
an economy with distortionary taxes, revenue collection is, itself, costly, and this cost ought to 
be recognized also in the provision of public goods. Pigou wrote 
 
   “Where there is indirect damage, it ought to be added to the direct loss of satisfaction 
involved in the withdrawal of the marginal unit of resources by taxation, before this is 
balanced against the satisfaction yielded by the marginal expenditure. It follows that, in 
general, expenditures ought not to be carried so far as to make the real yield of the last unit of 
resources expended by the government equal to the real yield of the last unit left in the hand 
of the representative citizen” (1947, page 34). 
 
This argument has been discussed by several prominent researchers such as Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974). We will here concentrate on the first part of 
Pigou’s statement, i.e. that the total marginal cost (including ‘indirect damage’) ought to be   36
balanced against the marginal benefit. This means that our concern is to analyze the cost 
benefit rule for public provision and compare it to the first best policy rule discussed in 
subsection 8.1. To illustrate, let us write the budget constraint facing the representative 
consumer as 
 
 (1 ) 0 wl c τ −− =      (38) 
 
where  τ  is the labor income tax rate. Each individual maximizes the utility function in 
equation (32) subject to the budget constraint in equation (38). The first order conditions for 
consumption and hours of work can be combined to imply 
 
 ( ( 1) , , ) ( 1) ( ( 1) , , ) cz u w lz g w u w lz g 0 τ ττ − −− − =    (39) 
 
By using zzl =− , where z  is a time endowment, equation (39) implicitly defines a labor 
supply function,  (,) ll g ω = , where  (1 ) w ω τ = −  is the marginal wage rate. We can solve for 
the private consumption by substituting the labor supply function into the private budget 
constraint. 
 
Suppose once again that a benevolent government with a utilitarian objective provides the 
public good. The decision-problem facing the government is to choose τ  and   to maximize 
the social welfare function 
g
 
  (,) ( (,) , (,) ,) W n vgn u cg z lg g ω ωω == −    (40) 
 
subject to its budget constraint 
 
  (,) 0 nwl g g τ ωκ −=      (41) 
 
Note that, in formulating the social welfare function, we have made use of the indirect utility 
function,  , as the labor supply and consumption behavior of each individual is recognized 
by the government. Let 
() v ⋅
γ  denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government 
budget constraint. In addition to equation (41), the first order conditions then become 
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       (42) 
2 [ nwv nwl wl ω γτ −+ − = ] 0 ω
0   [] gg nv nwl γ τκ +− =      (43) 
 
in which subindices denote partial derivatives. To shorten the notations, we have suppressed 
the arguments in the functions   and  () v ⋅ () l ⋅  in equations (42) and (43). Let us now analyze 
what these conditions imply in terms of public good provision. According to the Envelope 
Theorem, ( , ) ( , , ) gg vg u c z g ω = , which enables us to write equation (43) in the same form as 
equation (37) 
 










is typically referred to as the marginal cost of public funds. This term was equal to one in the 
preceding subsection, where we used lump-sum taxes to collect revenue. One interpretation of 
the marginal cost of public funds is that it represents the marginal cost of raising tax revenues 
(measured in real terms), whereas another equivalent interpretation is that it is the multiplier 
to be applied to the direct marginal resource cost of the public good to provide the correct 
incentives for public good provision. The latter will be apparent in the special case with a 
separable utility function to be discussed below. By using the Envelope Theorem once again 
to show that  ( , ) ( , , ) c vg u c z g ω l ω = , and if the labor supply is upward sloping, so   
(which appears to be a reasonable assumption), we see that equation (42) implies 
0 lω >













     (45) 
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where / l ω l ε ω =  is the hours of work elasticity with respect to the marginal wage rate. 
According to equation (45), the marginal cost of public funds depends on two important 
determinants; the income tax rate and the labor supply elasticity with respect to the marginal 
wage rate. An increase in either of these variables contributes to increase the right hand side 
of equation (45). Combining equations (44) and (45), we see that Pigou’s conjecture is correct 
in part. Indeed,   works to increase the right hand side of equation (44) – relative to the 
case where   - which, in turn, necessitates a modification of the public provision to 
increase the sum of marginal rates of substitution (an adjustment which one would normally 
expect to lead to less public provision)
1 m >
1 m =
10. However, the public good will, itself, also affect the 
tax revenues, which is seen from the second term within the square bracket on the right hand 
side of equation (44), and this effect can be either positive or negative depending on whether 
leisure is complementary with, or substitutable for, the public good. 
 
If the public good is separable from the other goods in the utility function, meaning that the 
hours of work no longer directly depend on the provision of the public good, equation (44) 
simplifies to read 
 
  , gc nMRS mκ =      (46) 
 
Equation (46) means that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between the public good 
and the private consumption is equal to the product of the marginal rate of transformation and 
the marginal cost of public funds, which accords very well with the first part of the statement 
by Pigou mentioned above. 
 
For further analysis of public good provision, the reader is referred to Wilson (1991), Sandmo 
(1998) and Gaube (2000). Gaube gives a thorough analysis of the second part of Pigou’s 
statement; namely, whether the use of distortionary taxes leads to less provision of public 
goods compared to the situation with lump-sum taxes. 
 
8.3 Briefly on Heterogeneity and Asymmetric Information 
 
Although the analysis in the previous subsection exemplifies why distortionary taxation may 
necessitate a modification of the Samuelson rule for public good provision, it is by no means a   39
realistic description of real world public policy. This is so for at least two reasons. First, there 
is no apparent reason for the government to use distortionary taxation, other than that we have 
assumed that it must do so. Rather, if all individuals are identical, one would expect that 
lump-sum taxes are feasible. Second, we have not addressed redistribution (which is, of 
course, also a consequence of using a representative agent economy). We will here briefly 
address public good provision in an economy, where the government redistributes by using 
nonlinear taxes. 
 
There is a large and growing literature dealing with public policy in economies with nonlinear 
tax instruments
11. Why is it interesting to extend the study of public good provision to an 
economy with nonlinear taxes? One reason is that nonlinear income taxes constitute a 
reasonably realistic description of the tax instruments that many countries have (or potentially 
have) at their disposal. In this case, the decision made by the government to use distortionary 
income taxation will follow from optimization, subject to the available information, and not 
be a direct consequence of arbitrary restrictions imposed on the set of policy instruments. 
Another reason is that this framework also sheds further light on the interesting question of 
why it is optimal to deviate from the first best Samuelson rule. 
 
We follow Boadway and Keen (1993), who base their analysis on the two-type optimal 
income tax model developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). Therefore, consider an 
economy with two ability-types; a low-ability type (denoted by superindex 1) and a high-
ability type (denoted by superindex 2). This distinction refers to productivity, meaning that 
the high-ability type faces a higher before tax wage rate than the low-ability type. Without 
any loss of generality, we normalize the number of individuals of each ability-type to one. 












    ()
ii ii i wl T wl c −− 0 =
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where   is the income tax payment. As before, we assume that each individual treats the 
public good as exogenous. The first order condition for the hours of work can be written as 
() T ⋅
 
       (47)  [1 '( )] 0
ii i i i




where   is the marginal income tax rate, and we have used the short notation 
. Subindices denote partial derivatives. 
'() T ⋅
(,,)
ii i uu c z g =
 
We assume the government faces a general social welfare function 
 
       (48) 
12 (, ) WW u u =
 
in which it attaches weight to the utilities of both ability-types. An alternative formulation 
would be to assume that the government maximizes the utility of one of the ability-types 
subject to a minimum utility restriction for the other. This formulation would give the same 
expressions for the marginal income tax rates and policy rule for public provision as those 
derived below. 
 
As in most of the earlier literature on the self-selection approach to optimal taxation, the 
government can observe income, although ability is private information. We also assume that 
the government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. Therefore, 
we would like to prevent the high-ability type from mimicking the low-ability type in order to 
gain from redistribution. In other words, the high-ability type should at least weakly prefer the 
allocation intended for him/her over the allocation intended for the low-ability type. A high-
ability type who pretends to be a low-ability type is called a mimicker. The self-selection 
constraint that may bind then becomes 
 
         (49) 
22 2 1 1ˆ (, ,) (, ,) uu c z gu c Hl gu φ =≥ −
 
where   is the wage ratio (relative wage rate), implying that 
1 / ww φ =
1 l φ  is the hours of work 
that the mimicker must supply to reach the same income as the low-ability type.  The 
expression on the right hand side of the weak inequality is the utility of the mimicker, which   41
is denoted by the hat. The mimicker enjoys the same consumption as the low-ability type, 
although the mimicker enjoys more leisure (as the mimicker is more productive than the low-
ability type). 
 
Note that the function   is a general labor income tax. As such, it can be used here to 
implement any desired combination of  ,  ,   and  . The reader may, for instance, think 
of a tax function with ability-type specific intercepts and slopes. It is, therefore, convenient to 
directly use  ,  ,   and   as decision-variables, instead of choosing these variables 
indirectly via the tax function. As will be explained below, we can, nevertheless, infer what 
these choices imply in terms of tax policy. We write the budget constraint facing the 
government as 













wl c g κ 0 − −= ∑      (50) 
 
in which we have used  .  ( )
ii ii i Tw l w l c =−
 
The decision-problem facing the government is to choose  ,  ,  ,   and   to maximize 
the social welfare function given by equation (48) subject to the self-selection and budget 







12 2 2 ˆ (, ) [ ] [ ( ) ]
ii i
i
LW u u u u w l c g λ γκ =+ − +− − ∑    (51) 
 












=           (52) 
12











































∂ ∑ 0 κ
i c
        (56) 
 
where (as before) subindices denote partial derivatives, e.g.  /
ii
c uu = ∂∂  and similarly for the 
other variables. 
 
Let us begin by briefly discussing the optimal tax structure and then turn to public good 
provision, which is the main issue in this section. Denote by  , /
ii
zc z c
i MRS u u =  the marginal rate 
of substitution between leisure and private consumption for ability-type i. By combining 
equations (52) and (53), we obtain 
 
       (57) 
12 2 1
, ˆˆ [] zc c z MRS u u w λγ λ φ γ += + = 0
 
Now, using the private first order condition to derive   and then 
substituting into equation (57), we can derive an expression for the marginal income tax rate 
of the low-ability type 
11 1 1 1









     (58) 
 
in which 
2 ˆ / c u λ λ =
(
γ
2 , whereas 
22
, ˆ ˆˆ / zc z c MRS u u =  is the marginal rate of substitution between 
leisure and private consumption facing the mimicker. Note that the mimicker needs to forego 
less leisure than the low-ability type to accomplish a given increase in the private 
consumption. Therefore, as pointed out by e.g. Stiglitz (1982), the expression within the 
square bracket is positive, implying . The intuition is that, by imposing a positive 
marginal income tax rate on the low-ability type (instead of a zero rate), mimicking becomes 
less attractive, which contributes to relax the self-selection constraint. In other words, the 
positive marginal income tax rate facing the low-ability type serves the purpose of 
discouraging mimicking; as such, it also creates additional room for redistribution. By using 
11 '( ) 0 Tw l>  43




22 '( ) 0 Tw l =       ( 5 9 )  
 
which is the ‘two ability-type version’ of the zero-at-the-top-result; e.g. Phelps (1973) and 
Sadka (1976). The intuition is that we cannot relax the self-selection constraint further by 
distorting the labor supply behavior of the high-ability type. However, note that the tax 
formulas derived above presuppose fixed gross wage rates, which we have assumed here. If 
the gross wage rates are endogenous, then the wage ratio (which, in part, determines the hours 
of work that the mimicker needs to supply to reach the same income as the low-ability type) is 
also endogenous. In this case (and if we assume constant returns to scale in production), one 
would typically find that the marginal income tax rate facing the high-ability type is negative, 
whereas the marginal income tax rate facing the low-ability type is positive
12; see Stern 
(1982) and Stiglitz (1982). 
 
Turning to public good provision, our concern is again to see how and why the second best 
policy rule for the public good deviates from the Samuelson rule. Note that the first term on 
the left hand side of equation (56) can be written as  , (/)
ii i
g c i c MRS W u u ∂∂ ∑ . Therefore, by 
solving equations (53) and (55) for   and  , respectively, substituting 
the resulting expressions into equation (56) and rearranging, we obtain 
11 (/) c Wu u ∂∂
















, ˆ ˆˆ / g cg c MRS u u =  is the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and 
private consumption for the mimicker. By analogy to the marginal income tax rates discussed 
above, the self-selection constraint again determines to what extent it is optimal to deviate 
from the first best policy rule. If leisure is complementary with public consumption in the 
sense that the marginal willingness to pay for the public good (measured as marginal rate of 
substitution between the public good and the private consumption good) increases with the 
use of leisure, then 
1
, ˆ 2
, g cg c MRS MRS < . In this case, equation (60) implies that we ought to   44
supply the public good up to a point where the sum of marginal rates of substitution exceeds 
the marginal rate of transformation. If, on the other hand, leisure is substitutable for the public 
good in the analogous sense, so 
1
, ˆ 2
, g cg c MRS MRS > , equation (60) gives the opposite result: we 
ought to supply the public good up to a point where the sum of marginal rates of substitution 
falls short of the marginal rate of transformation. 
 
The intuition behind these results is straight forward: we are able to use the public good as a 
means to relax the self-selection constraint and, therefore, create further room for 
redistribution. This provides an incentive for the government to deviate from the Samuelson 
rule. If leisure is complementary with the public good, implying that the mimicker attaches a 
higher marginal value to the public good than does the low-ability type, reducing the public 
provision below the level indicated by the Samuelson rule causes a greater utility loss for the 
mimicker than it does for the low-ability type. Therefore, reduced public provision enables us 
to discourage mimicking and relax the self-selection constraint. The intuition will be 
analogous in the case where leisure is substitutable for the public good. 
 
This discussion also enables us to identify an interesting special case. If leisure is weakly 
separable from the other goods in the utility function, meaning that the utility function takes 
the form  , where  ( ( , ), )
ii ub c g z ϕ =
i () b ⋅  is a subutility function defined over the private 
consumption good and the public good, then the marginal rate of substitution between the 
public good and the private consumption does not depend on the leisure choice (other than via 
income). In this case, therefore, 
1
, ˆ 2
, g cg c MRS MRS = , meaning that the second term on the left 
hand side of equation (60) is zero. As a consequence, the policy rule for the public good 
corresponds to the Samuelson rule; see also Christiansen (1981). The intuition is that we 
cannot, in this case, relax the self-selection constraint by deviating from the Samuelson rule, 
implying that the government in our model will not do so. 
 
For additional reading on public good provision and/or other resource allocation problems in 
economies with nonlinear income taxes, see e.g. Mirrlees (1971), Phelps (1973), Sadka 
(1976), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Christiansen (1981), Stern (1982), Stiglitz (1982), 
Boadway and Keen (1993), Edwards et al. (1994), Cremer and Ghavari (2000), and Aronsson 
and Sjögren (2004). 
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9. More on Mechanism design 
 
The self selection constraint that was used in connection with optimal taxation, and the Clark-
Groves mechanism which was introduced to elicit the willingness to pay for public goods, are 
two examples of a quite modern branch of Economics that is called Mechanism design (the 
basic idea behind the Clarke–Groves mechanism was already present in Vickery (1961); 
therefore, it is sometimes referred to as the Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism). Another 
example is Arrow’s attempt to aggregate individual preferences into a social ordering that has 
certain desirable properties. Loosely speaking, he shows that there is no such mechanism. 
Other well known mechanism design principles are found in terms of auction mechanisms.  
 
Mechanisms design was born from the discussions on planned versus market economies 
during the 1930s and 1940s, between Oscar Lange and Abba P Lerner on one side (planning), 
and Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mieses on the other (the market). Enrico Barone 
(1912) had suggested that a perfect market economy and a perfectly planned market economy 
were equivalent. This claim was supported by Lange and Lerner. Lerner even bought a car 
and went down to Mexico to convince a Trotsky in exile about the marginal principles. 
Mieses and Hayek argued that perfect markets had properties that could not be replicated by a 
planned system. 
 
However, at the time, the conceptual apparatus needed to unambiguously define the 
competing claims, and the technical tools - notably game theory - to derive clear conclusions 
were lacking. Leonid Hurwicz (1960, 1972) led the way in developing both the conceptual 
framework and the theoretical tools. He coined the term “incentive compatibility”. A 
mechanism is incentive compatible, if no agent has the incentive to pretend having any 
characteristics other than the true ones. Hence, the design of the optimal taxation problem is 
an example of an incentive compatible mechanism, and so is the Clarke-Groves mechanism. 
In particular Hurwicz pointed out that a market run by a Walrasian auctioneer would typically 
not satisfy incentive compatibility, if there is a finite number of individuals, because each 
buyer would understate her demand at a given price, and each seller would understate his 
supply (a continuum of individuals would help).  He went on showing that no (privacy 
respecting) incentive compatibility mechanism can be Pareto efficient in the usual sense. 
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There remained a couple of important problems to be solved in a practically feasible manner.  
One was that to find an optimal mechanism under a given goal function, it is necessary to 
define the set of all feasible communication systems. However, such a set is very likely to be 
huge, and quite hopeless to represent and analyze. One breakthrough came with the 
development of “The Revelation Principle” (Allan Gibbard (1973), Partha Dasgupta, Peter 
Hammond, and Eric Maskin (1979), Robert Myerson (1979)). This principle says that one can 
restrict the search to a much smaller class called direct mechanisms. Under a direct 
mechanism, agents’ messages are reports (truthful or not) of their private information (type); 
in the optimal taxation problem above, whether they are high-skilled or low-skilled. A direct 
mechanism assigns outcomes to the list of messages, one from each agent. The mechanism is 
said to be incentive compatible, if it induces each individual to tell the truth about his/her type 
(private information). The revelation principle states that for any arbitrary mechanism, there 
exists a direct mechanism that does just as well in terms of the value of the objective (welfare) 
function. In other words, the mechanism design problem can be reduced to the choice of a 
direct mechanism that maximizes the value of the objective function, subject to an incentive 
compatibility constraint and a participation constraint. The latter sees to that an agent who has 
a possibility to exit the “game” prefers to stay. Typically it means that the outcome of the 
game gives the agents more than a minimum (reservation) utility level. 
 
A second problem is, however, that incentive compatible mechanisms may give rise to 
multiple equilibria, of which at least one means truth telling, whereas some others do not. It 
would be desirable to design mechanism such that all equilibrium outcomes are (second best) 
social optima. Fulfilling the quest that every social optimum is an equilibrium outcome, and 
that every equilibrium outcome is a social optimum is an important implementation problem. 
This problem was “solved” by Eric Maskin (1977). He introduced a new class of mechanisms 
called canonical mechanisms. They are quite complex and cannot be interpreted as if agents 
only report their type. However, the good news is that Maskin’s results are “possibility 
theorems”, showing that under certain conditions, implementation is possible. The second 
best mechanisms cannot, however, get rid of Arrow’s dictator. 
 
There are many applications of the mechanism design theory and the revelation principle. 
Many of them are connected to optimal auctions; others refer to public goods production, 
regulation and auditing and optimal procurement mechanisms. For Vickery-Clark-Groves   47
mechanisms that have been used to solve practical problems, the reader is referred to Edward 
Clarke’s homepage (www.clarke.pair.com/apppubgoods.html).                            
 
            10. National Welfare Measures in Dynamic Economies 
 
During the last 30 years, a theory of social accounting, which is based on growth theoretical 
models, has gradually been developed. One of the most interesting ideas behind the theory of 
social accounting is the aim of constructing a comprehensive net national product (NNP) 
measure, which can be used as a welfare indicator in a dynamic economy. The comprehensive 
NNP can be thought of as an extension of the conventional NNP, where the extension is 
designed to reflect all relevant aspects of consumption and capital formation for society. As 
the study of economy-wide welfare measures has become an increasingly important part of 
Welfare Economics, we will briefly discuss the theory of social accounting here. We start 
with the seminal contribution by Weitzman (1976) and then continue by explaining some of 
the more recent research developments. 
 
10.1 A Basic Dynamic Model 
 
In this subsection, we describe the model, whereas the formal welfare analysis is carried out 
in subsections 10.2 and 10.3 below. The model is based on Brock (1977), where production 
releases emissions. These emissions add to a stock of pollution, which causes a consumption 
externality. From our perspective, this model is suitable to use here for at least two reasons. 
First, by introducing a market failure, we are able to make a distinction between a first best 
welfare measure and a welfare measure applicable in an imperfect market economy. As we 
will argue below, this distinction is important for understanding the welfare foundation of 
comprehensive NNP. It also provides a framework for analyzing dynamic analogues to the 
Pigouvian taxes discussed in Section 7. Second, environmental aspects are often emphasized 
in the study of social accounting, meaning that we able to connect this section to a major 
theme in earlier literature; namely, how to make the national accounts ‘greener’. Subsections 
10.2 and 10.3 are largely based on Aronsson et al. (2004). 
 
The consumers are assumed to be identical and have infinite planning horizons. We follow the 
convention in the literature on social accounting by disregarding population growth, and we 
normalize the population to equal one. In addition, as the labor supply behavior of the   48
consumer is of no direct importance for the results to be derived below, we simplify by 
disregarding the utility of leisure and, instead, assume that the consumer supplies one unit of 
labor inelastically at each instant. The instantaneous utility function at time t is written as 
 
() (() , () ) ut uct xt =      (61) 
 
where c is private consumption (as before) and x the stock of pollution. We assume the 
function   is increasing in c, decreasing in x and strictly concave.  ) (⋅ u
 
Turning to the production side, we assume identical competitive firms, whose number is 
normalized to one, produce a homogenous good by using labor (normalized to one and 
suppressed), capital and emissions (through the use of energy inputs). The production 
function is given by 
 
() ( () , () ) y tf k t g t =      (62) 
 
where y denotes net output, meaning that depreciation has been accounted for, k the capital 
stock and g energy use. We assume that the function  ) (⋅ f  is increasing in each argument and 
strictly concave. 
 
The stock of pollution accumulates according to the differential equation 
 
() () () x tg t x t γ =− &      (63) 
 
where (0,1) γ ∈  reflects the assimilative capacity of the environment. To connect emissions to 
energy input in a simple way, we assume (with very little loss of generality) that the emissions 
equal the input of energy. 
 
The accumulation of physical capital obeys the differential equation 
 
() ( () , () ) () kt fkt gt ct = & −      (64) 
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10.2 Welfare Measurement in the First Best Social Optimum 
 
To derive the first best social optimum, it is convenient to assume that the resource allocation 
is decided upon by a benevolent social planner, whose objective coincides with the utility 
function facing the representative consumer (recall that the consumers are identical, meaning 
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() ( () , () ) () kt fkt gt ct = & −      (66) 
() () () x tg t x t γ =− &       ( 6 7 )  
 
as well as subject to initial conditions,  0 (0) 0 kk = >  and  0 (0) 0 xx = > , and terminal 
conditions,   and  . The parameter  lim ( ) 0 t kt →∞ ≥ lim ( ) 0 t xt →∞ ≥ θ  is the intertemporal rate of 
time preference (or utility discount rate). 
 
Neglecting the time indicator for notational convenience, the present value Hamiltonian can 
be written as 
 
(,)
t Hu c x e k x
θ λ μ
− =+ & & +      (68) 
 
where λ  and μ  are costate variables. In addition to equations (66) and (67), as well as to the 
initial and terminal conditions, the necessary conditions are (for more detail the reader is 












=      (69)   50






=+ =      (70) 
∂
(, ) k f kg λλ =− &       ( 7 1 )  
(,)
t
x uc x e
θ μ μγ
− =− + &      (72) 
lim 0( 0if lim ( ) 0)
tt kt λ
→∞ →∞ ≥= >     (73) 
lim 0( 0if lim ( ) 0)
tt xt μ
→∞ →∞ ≥= >     (74) 
 




0 { () , () , () , () , () , () } ctgtktxt t t λμ
∞ 
 
denote the socially optimal resource allocation. By totally differentiating the present value 





(( ) ,( ) )
t dH t
uc t x t e
dt
θ θ
− =−      (75) 
 
Equation (75) is a direct consequence of the dynamic Envelope Theorem: all indirect effects 
of time via control, state and costate variables vanish as a consequence of optimization, as the 
resource allocation obeys the necessary conditions given by equations (69)-(74). Therefore, 
only the direct effect of time remains in equation (75), which is due to the explicit time-
dependence of the utility discount factor. By solving equation (75) subject to the 
transversality condition 
* lim ( ) 0 t Ht →∞ = , and transforming the solution to current value 
(multiplying by 
t e
θ ), we have
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t θ =  is the current value Hamiltonian. Although we have chosen to carry out 
the analysis in a utility metric (which is a choice motivated by convenience), an alternative is, 
of course, to use a money metric. See Li and Löfgren (2002).   51
 
Equation (76) is Weitzman’s (1976) result applied to our model. It means that the present 
value of future utility at time t is proportional to the current value Hamiltonian at time t. The 
current value Hamiltonian is, in turn, interpretable as the comprehensive NNP in utility terms. 
To see this, note that the current value Hamiltonian can be written as 
 
     (77) 
** ** * * () ( () , () ) () () () ()






θ λ λ =  and 
c e
t θ μ μ =  are current value costate variables. The current value 
Hamiltonian measures the utility value of the current consumption plus the utility value of the 
current net investments. For the simple economy considered here, the consumption concept 
refers to goods and services, c, and pollution, x, whereas the net investments refer to the 
changes in the physical capital stock,  , and the additions to the stock of pollution,  k & x & . To 
facilitate the interpretation of the current value Hamiltonian in terms of comprehensive NNP, 
let us linearize equation (77). By using equation (69), we can rewrite the instantaneous utility 
function as follows; 
 
       (78)  (,) [ ]
c ucx c x s λρ =+ +
 
where   is the consumer surplus and  (,) (,)
c
x s ucx c u cxx λ =− − ( , )/ ( , ) xc uc xuc x ρ =  the 
marginal rate of substitution between pollution and private consumption. For a thorough 
analysis of the role of the consumer surplus in social accounting, see Li and Löfgren (2002)
14. 
 
We can now rewrite equation (76) as 
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in which  . Equation (79) means that the present value of future utility 
(which is our welfare measure) is proportional to the sum of the linearized current value 
Hamiltonian and the consumer surplus. The linearized current value Hamiltonian is, in turn 
( ) ( )/ ( )
cc tt τμλ =  52
the real comprehensive NNP times the marginal utility value of capital. For the economy set 
out here, the comprehensive NNP contains four parts. The first two terms represent the 
conventional NNP, the third term reflects the marginal value of pollution as a consumption 
good (bad), and the fourth term represents the marginal value of additions to the stock of 
pollution (the net investment aspect of the environment). In general, the real comprehensive 
NNP does not constitute an exact real welfare measure due to the appearance of the consumer 
surplus in equation (79). However, in the special case where the instantaneous utility function 
is linear homogenous, s=0, meaning that the real comprehensive NNP is proportional to the 
present value of future utility. 
 
Weitzman’s somewhat surprising result means that welfare at time t can be measured solely 
by using information referring to time t, although the welfare concept itself (the present value 
of future utility) is fundamentally intertemporal. What is the intuition behind this result? We 
start by observing that net investment at time t is optimally adjusted to consumption according 
to equation (69), which tells us that the present value at time t of an extra unit of consumption 
equals the present value of one additional unit of capital invested at time t. The non-arbitrage 
conditions, given by equations (71) and (72), mean that it is unprofitable to reallocate capital 
over time. This is true for all kinds of capital including the stock of pollution. Moreover, the 
use of energy at time t is optimally adjusted by equation (70), implying that the utility value 
of the last unit of energy used in production just equals the present value of the future 
disutility created by additional pollution. In other words, the costate variables capture the 
future welfare effects of the actions taken today. The final piece that generates proportionality 
is that the time preference is constant (otherwise, it would not be possible to place the rate of 
time preference outside the integral in equation (76)). 
 
To be able to give a graphical interpretation of the current value Hamiltonian, let us finally 
consider Figure 4, where we use the short notations PC c x ρ = +  and  .  [ / ]
cc QI k x μλ =+ & &





         Figure 4: The Static Welfare Equivalent 
 
In Figure 4, the area PC represents the producers’ surplus, CS the consumers’ surplus and QI 
the value of net investments. Therefore, the rectangle area PC+QI measures the value-in-
exchange, i.e. the real comprehensive NNP (the linearized current value Hamiltonian divided 
by the marginal utility of income). Adding the consumers’ surplus to real comprehensive 
NNP, we obtain the welfare measure. 
             
 
10.3 Welfare Measurement in the Decentralized Economy 
 
If the resource allocation is first best and the optimal control problem time-autonomous 
(except for the explicit time-dependence of the utility discount factor), we saw in the previous 
subsection that the current value Hamiltonian constitutes an exact welfare measure. In a 
decentralized economy, on the other hand, the resource allocation is not necessarily optimal 
from the perspective of society, meaning that the shadow prices may not correctly measure 
the future welfare consequences of the actions taken today. Therefore, Weitzman’s (1976) 
welfare measure needs no longer apply. To illustrate, we consider a decentralized version of 
the model set out above, in which the externalities associated with pollution have not become 
internalized. 
 
The utility maximization problem facing the consumer is given by 
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as well as subject to the initial condition,  0 ) 0 ( k k = , and a No-Ponzi Game (NPG) condition 
meaning that the present value of the asset (physical capital) is nonnegative at the terminal 
point. Equation (81) is the asset accumulation equation. The consumer supplies one unit of 
labor inelastically at each instant and earns labor income   as well as rents capital at the 
market rate of interest   to the representative firm. The term 
( ) wt
) (t r 0 ) ( ≥ t π represents possible 
profit income. Note that the representative consumer treats the development of the stock of 
pollution as exogenous. For later use, note also that the present value Hamiltonian implicit in 
the consumer’s decision-problem can be written as 
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The representative firm would choose   and   to maximize profit at each point in time  ( ) kt ( ) gt
 
() ( () , () ) () () () t fkt gt wt rtkt π =− −      (83) 
 
If we combine the first order conditions for the consumer and the firm, the following 
conditions are among those obeyed by the decentralized equilibrium (neglecting the time 
indicator for notational convenience); 
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There are two principal differences between the necessary conditions characterizing the 
decentralized economy and the first best optimal resource allocation. First, emissions are free 
of charge here, implying that the firm uses emissions up to a point where the marginal product 
of emissions is zero. Second, the stock of pollution is not an endogenous state variable in the 
decentralized economy; it is, instead, a side effect of the behavior of the firm and exogenous 
to the consumer. Let 
 
00000
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denote the equilibrium in the uncontrolled market economy, where the government makes no 
attempt to reduce the negative effects of pollution. 
 
Does the Hamiltonian governing consumer choices in the decentralized economy constitute a 
welfare measure? Let us carry out the same type of analysis as we did in the previous 
subsection. By totally differentiating the present value Hamiltonian in equation (82) with 
respect to time and using the necessary conditions, we obtain 
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The second term on the right hand side of equation (88) arises because the stock of pollution 
is not en endogenous state variable; it is, instead, an exogenous function of time from the 
perspective of the representative consumer. In other words, there is no condition to balance 
the marginal benefits and costs of pollution, implying a positive first order welfare effect of t 
via x. Solving equation (88) subject to 
0 lim ( ) 0 t Ht →∞ =  and then transforming to current 
value, we obtain the welfare measure 
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represents the value of the marginal externality. Note also that, if we were to reinterpret the 
value of the marginal externality a ‘shadow price of time’, i.e. as the shadow price of the 
artificial state variable  , equation (89) may be written in the same general way as 
equation (76) above. 
( ) ht t =
 
Equation (89) means that the present value of future utility (i.e. our welfare measure) is 
proportional to the sum of the current value Hamiltonian and the present value of the marginal 
externality. Note that this form of the welfare measure does not depend on the assumption that 
the government makes no attempt at all to internalize the externality. If the government makes 
such attempts, while failing to fully internalize the externality, the welfare measure will still 
take the same general form as in equation (89)
15, even if the magnitudes of the terms on the 
right hand side would change
16. This particular form of the welfare measure should come as 
no surprise to the reader, since the externality is exogenous to the consumer
17. The practical 
problem is, of course, that the value of the marginal externality is forward looking: the actions 
taken today have future welfare effects which, in the context of an uncontrolled (or 
imperfectly controlled) market economy are not accurately captured by the shadow prices 
implicit in the resource allocation. As such numbers cannot be elicited from market data, we 
do not envy the national income statistician whose job is to collect (or approximate) this 
information in practice. However, some guidance can be found in Aronsson and Löfgren 
(1999). 
 
Let us now briefly return to the discussion of Pigouvian taxes in Section 7. The idea here is to 
introduce a dynamic analogue to the Pigouvian tax, which is such that the agents in the 
decentralized version of our dynamic model replicate the choices made by the social planner 
in subsection 10.2. In fact, the dynamic analogue to the Pigouvan tax plays two roles here; it 
brings the economy to the first best social optimum, and it provides useful information for 
accounting purposes by measuring the social opportunity cost of emissions. Recall that the 
externality analyzed here is caused by the use of emissions by the firm. This accumulates a 
stock of pollution which, in turn, tends to reduce the utility of the consumer. Therefore, if we 
were to impose an emission tax on the firm, which is designed to reflect the value of additions 
to the stock of pollution, and then repay the tax revenues lump-sum to the consumer (meaning 
that the budget constraint of the government balances at each instant), the externality would 
become internalized. To be more specific, suppose that we were to choose a sequence of 
emission taxes,   57
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where   is the real value of additions to the stock of pollution in the first best 
optimum (i.e. the real shadow price of 
** ()/ () t μλ t
*() x t & ), and then impose this sequence of taxes on the 
firm, one can show that the decentralized equilibrium is, in fact, the first best socially optimal 
resource allocation; see also Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993). 
 
Note that the dynamic analogue to the Pigouvian tax is forward looking. This is seen because, 
if we were to solve equation (72) subject to the relevant transversality condition, we obtain 
 
   










Therefore, the shadow price relevant for measuring the social value of additions to the stock 
of pollution is the present value of future marginal utilities of pollution; entities that are by no 
means easier to evaluate in practice than the value of the marginal externality in the 
decentralized economy. 
 
For further reading about social accounting problems in distorted market economies, the 
reader is referred to Aronsson and Löfgren (1999), Li and Löfgren (2002), and Aronsson 
(1998, 2007). See also the textbook by Aronsson et al. (2004). 
 
10.4 Briefly on Cost Benefit Analysis in Dynamic Models 
 
The Hamiltonian is not only a useful tool for social accounting by being the comprehensive 
NNP in utility terms; it is also a useful tool for cost benefit analysis. Léonard (1987), Caputo 
(1990) and LaFrance and Barney (1991) have all given important contributions by eliciting 
formal cost benefit rules for parametric changes in optimal control models. Just to explain the 
basic idea (formal proofs are found in the aforementioned studies as well as in Aronsson et al. 
(1997)), note that the present value Hamiltonian, if evaluated at an equilibrium, can be written 
as a function of the parameters of the problem and of time itself. By using the model analyzed   58
in the previous two subsections, and exemplifying by focusing on the first best social 
optimum, the optimal value function at time 0 is given by 
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where  α  is any parameter (i.e. a technological parameter, a parameter characterizing an 
important aspect of public policy etc.), on which the initially optimal resource allocation is 
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in which 
*(, ) Ht α  is the present value Hamiltonian at time t, which is evaluated in the 
initially optimal (pre-change) resource allocation. Equation (91) is a straight forward 
consequence of the dynamic envelope theorem. All indirect effects of α  via control, state and 
co-state variables vanish as a consequence of optimization, meaning that all that remains is to 
take the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to α  (i.e. the direct effect of α )  
and then integrate over the planning horizon.  Therefore, this is the dynamic analogue to the 
cost benefit rule derived in a static model in Section 3. 
 
For further study of methodological aspects of cost benefit analysis in dynamic general 
equilibrium models, the reader is referred to Léonard (1987), Caputo (1990), LaFrance and 
Barney (1991), Aronsson et al. (1997) and Li and Löfgren (2007). 
 
11. Final Comments and Short Summary 
 
The idea behind this chapter has been to give an overview of modern welfare theory or, at 
least, a significant part thereof. We decided ‘to start from the beginning’ by giving the reader 
a historical perspective on the issues dealt with in a more formal way later on. We have not, 
for obvious reasons, been able to cover all relevant aspects in great detail (in fact, part of our 
discussion more resembles ‘a scrap on the surface’), which we have tried to compensate for 
by giving suitable references for further study. As such, the chapter may serve as a starting   59
point for the study of welfare economics at the graduate level. Readers who want to go deeper 
into specific topics ought to combine it with more specialized texts; in fact, a large such 
complementary literature is available. 
 
At the core of our chapter are traditional issues and tools that any user of modern welfare 
theory must be aware of, such as the First and Second Welfare Theorems, Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem, and situations were the markets themselves do not give rise to an 
optimal resource allocation from society’s point of view; the latter being exemplified by 
externalities and public goods. As a consequence, the chapter also touches upon the normative 
theory of taxation. We have also taken further steps by introducing social accounting and the 
associated problem of measuring welfare - a growing area of research in welfare economics - 
as well as introduced methods for cost benefit analysis in dynamic economies. It is our hope 
that the reader will find this ‘smorgasbord’ an interesting starting point, and that it may 
stimulate further study of welfare theory. 
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* The authors would like to thank Pei-Chen Gong, Jason F. Shogren and Tomas Sjögren for helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
 
1 Little is known of Cantillon’s early life. He was born probably between 1680 and 1690, the second son of an 
Irish nobleman. His most famous work is the “Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en General”. The official year 
of publication is 1755, but this is 21 years after his death. A possible reason for this discrepancy is found in 
Niehans (1990). Cantillon is perhaps most famous for his insights in monetary theory and his general equilibrium 
theory of the three rents. An input output system more elaborated than that of Quesnay which was sketched 
around 1757.   
 
2 First mentioned by John Law (1705). 
 
3 Smith (1776), reprinted as Peguin Classics 1986) page 131-132.   
 
4 The first Italian edition appeared in 1906. The appendix of this book is best compared with Paul Samuelson, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis from (1947). For any utility function,  , a monotone transformation is 
given by   , with  . 
 
5 This was not at the time, as Niehan’s (1990) puts it, a revolutionary insight . It had been noted ten years later by 
the American Economist Irving Fisher in his thesis from 1892 published as Mathematical Investigations in the 
Theory of Value and Prices (1925).   
 
6 Pigouvian taxes was first introduced by the Dane Jens Warming (1911). He used them to solve for the first best 
allocation in an open access fishery model. 
  
7 Note that we also used the Envelope Theorem to derive equation (9) above. 
 
8 By substituting this expression for the subsidy into the individual budget constraint, one can see that the 
individual price of the public good, (1 κ −
*
, , is equal to  g c MRS
0 lω < 1 m <
12 / ww φ =
, which is commonly referred to as the 
Lindahl price. 
 
9 See Varian (1994) for additional detail. Clearly, the system of side payments can lead to budget balance 
problems.  Although it may not be possible to design a system where the payments sum to zero, the problem can 
be reduced such that the ‘effective side payment’ is nonpositive by supplementing the side payments with 
positive or negative lump-sum taxes (which do not affect the incentives at the individual level). 
 
10 Note that if  , then  , which means the opposite adjustment in terms of public provision. 
 
11 Seminal contributions to the literature on nonlinear and/or mixed taxation are Mirrlees (1971), Phelps (1973), 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Mirrlees (1976), Sadka (1976), Stern (1982), Stiglitz (1982) and Edwards et al.  
(1994). See also Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen (1993) for public good provision in economies with 
nonlinear taxation. 
   
12 The intuition is that a more compressed wage distribution (i.e. a higher wage ratio,  ) discourages 
mimicking. We may under certain conditions reach a more compressed wage distribution by discouraging the 
labor supply of the low-ability type (via a higher marginal income tax rate than would otherwise be chosen) and 
stimulating the labor supply of the high-ability type (via a lower marginal income tax rate than would otherwise 
be chosen). 
 
13 To be more specific, solving equation (75) up to time T gives   66
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Then, using  , one obtains equation (76). 
 
14 Their contribution is to relate the sum of comprehensive NNP and the consumer surplus to a real welfare 
measure defined in terms of the present value of future consumption. In addition, they also connect social 
accounting to price index theory. 
 
15 See Aronsson and Löfgren (1999). 
 
16 See Backlund (2003) for a numerical model of social accounting, in which the empirical importance of 
(uniniternalized) production externalities is assessed. 
 
17 A similar result will be obtained if the externality is replaced by disembodied technological change. See 
Aronsson and Löfgren (1993). 
  